Prominence and coherence in a Bayesian theory of pronoun interpretation by Kehler, Andrew & Rohde, Hannah
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prominence and coherence in a Bayesian theory of pronoun
interpretation
Citation for published version:
Kehler, A & Rohde, H 2019, 'Prominence and coherence in a Bayesian theory of pronoun interpretation',
Journal of Pragmatics, vol. 154, pp. 63-78. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2018.04.006
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1016/j.pragma.2018.04.006
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Journal of Pragmatics
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 02. Jan. 2020
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
Prominence and coherence in a Bayesian theory of pronoun
interpretation
Citation for published version:
Kehler, A & Rohde, H 2018, 'Prominence and coherence in a Bayesian theory of pronoun interpretation'
Journal of Pragmatics.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Early version, also known as pre-print
Published In:
Journal of Pragmatics
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 19. Apr. 2018
Prominence and Coherence in a Bayesian Theory of
Pronoun Interpretation
Andrew Kehler
University of California, San Diego
Hannah Rohde
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
A standard assumption in linguistic and psycholinguistic research on pronoun
use is that production and interpretation are guided by the same set of con-
textual factors. Kehler et al. (2008) and Kehler & Rohde (2013) have argued
instead for a model based on Bayesian principles in which pronoun production is
insensitive to a class of semantically- and pragmatically-driven contextual biases
that have been shown to influence pronoun interpretation. Here we evaluate the
model using a passage completion study that employs a subtle contextual ma-
nipulation to which traditional analyses are insensitive, specifically by varying
whether or not a relative clause that modifies the direct object in the context
sentence invites the inference of a cause of the event that the sentence denotes.
The results support the claim that pronoun interpretation biases, but not pro-
duction biases, are sensitive to this pragmatic enrichment, revealing precisely
the asymmetry predicted by our Bayesian Model. A correlation analysis fur-
ther establishes that the model provides better estimates of measured pronoun
interpretation biases than two competing models from the literature.
Keywords: Pronoun interpretation, discourse coherence, pragmatic
enrichment, Bayesian models
April 2, 2018
1. Introduction
A common wisdom, one assumed in the literature on pronominal reference
for decades, is that there is a unified notion of entity prominence that underlies
pronoun usage. This notion of prominence (alternately referred to as salience,
being in psychological focus, being the center of attention, and so
forth) will determine when a speaker will choose to use a pronoun on the one
hand, and hence be used by the addressee to successfully interpret the reference
on the other. On this assumption, the task for discourse researchers is then
clear: One merely needs to identify the different factors that contribute to entity
prominence. Many such factors have been posited, including grammatical role
[11], grammatical parallelism [42], thematic role [43, 3], information structure
[18, 37], semantics [29], and world knowledge [22], among others.
A central goal of this paper is to disabuse the reader of this assumption.
We do this by evaluating a proposal put forth by Kehler et al. [25] and Kehler
and Rohde [26] that states that the relationship between pronoun interpretation
and production is suitably cast in Bayesian terms, and further that the types
of factors that condition the likelihood term of Bayes’ Rule (the production
bias) and the prior (the bias toward entity next mention) are different. This
entails the counterintuitive conclusion that a set of factors that the addressee
will use in resolving the referent will not be taken into account by the speaker
when deciding whether to produce a pronoun. We evaluate the causal struc-
ture that underlies the proposal with a novel passage completion experiment
which confirms the predictions of the analysis. We further show that the bi-
ases revealed by the experimental results are more highly correlated with the
predictions of the Bayesian Model than those of two other prominent models.
Consequences for the notion of prominence as it relates to the interpretation of
referring expressions are discussed.
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2. Background
2.1. Previous Work on Pronoun Interpretation
The idea that a unified notion of prominence underlies reference interpreta-
tion and production has a substantial history in theoretical and experimental
linguistics over the last several decades. The underlying thought is intuitive:
At any particular time during a discourse, certain entities are being attended
to more than others by the conversational participants, and are likewise more
likely to be re-mentioned as the discourse ensues. As such, speakers can get
away with using reduced, if albeit semantically ambiguous, pronominal forms to
refer to such entities, under the assumption that they and their hearers are re-
lying on the same cues to entity prominence. Following Rohde and Kehler [37],
we will refer to accounts that assume such a relationship as mirror models, so
named to capture the idea that pronoun interpretation biases mirror the biases
that underlie the speaker’s decision to produce a pronoun.
The relationship between prominence and referential form has been posited
in a number of theories that seek to explain the contextual conditions under
which different referring expressions will be used.1 For instance, Givo´n [17]
associated a speaker’s choice of referring expression with a gradient scale of
topicality that entities can hold. According to his analysis, reduced referential
expressions (zeros, unstressed pronouns) correspond to those entities with the
highest topicality. In a similar spirit, Ariel [1] proposed an Accessibility Hi-
erarchy with which the production and interpretation of referring expressions
are said to correlate. In her account, the higher the degree of accessibility that
the intended referent holds, the lower the amount of lexical material that will
be used in the referring expression chosen by the speaker. As a particularly
reduced form of reference, pronouns are thus associated with a high presumed
degree of accessibility. Finally, Gundel et al. [21] propose a Givenness Hi-
1For an accessible overview of the literature on reference and various notions of prominence,
see Arnold [4].
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erarchy containing six possible cognitive statuses that a referent may hold
with respect to the hearer’s knowledge state and mental model of the discourse.
These statuses serve as the conventional meanings for different types of refer-
ring expressions across languages; pronouns are associated with the strongest
status in focus, which they characterize as holding when “the referent is...at
the current center of attention” (p. 279). Whereas there are differences with
respect to the pragmatic notions underlying the scales with which these authors
associate referential form, all posit that speakers and hearers take into account
the correspondence between form of reference and relative status of the referent
on these pragmatic scales in their productions and interpretations respectively.
That is, in selecting a particular referring expression, the speaker signals that
she assumes that the associated felicity conditions are met, and hence the hearer
is expected to utilize those same felicity conditions when identifying a speaker’s
intended referent.
Whereas the analyses just surveyed have focused on the respective topicality,
accessibility, and cognitive status of referents, others have focused on referent
predictability. For instance, Arnold’s Expectancy Hypothesis [2, 3] explicitly
links pronoun interpretation to the hearer’s expectations about what entities
are likely to be mentioned at the point in the discourse at which a pronoun
is encountered. Many factors potentially influence predictability on her model;
some that are familiar from the literature on pronoun interpretation were listed
in Section 1. The important difference between her model and many previous
ones is the relevance of predictive, top-down processing: Since these factors
are driving expectancies regarding to-be-mentioned entities, the majority of the
hearer’s work occurs during the normal course of (predictive) discourse compre-
hension. At the time a pronoun is subsequently encountered, the hearer can
simply match the pronoun against his expectations (taking into consideration
morphosyntactic constraints such as gender, number, person, and so forth). Al-
though Arnold’s model can also be seen as a type of Mirror Model, it will be
useful to distinguish accounts like hers and hence refer to them as Expectancy
Models, in recognition of the explicit link between prominence and predictabil-
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ity captured by the account.
The explicit tie between pronominalization and predictability is relevant to
larger controversies concerning communicative efficiency as a design principle of
language. For instance, according to the Uniform Information Density (UID)
hypothesis [31], language will be most efficient when speakers seek to maximize
communicative channel capacity. This requires that a relatively constant rate
of information transmission be maintained, which can only be achieved if ar-
ticulatory effort is kept proportional to the amount of information conveyed,
a quantity that is inversely proportional to the predictability of the message.
The hypothesis thus predicts that reduced referring expressions like pronouns
should be used to refer to entities that are highly predictable in context. Tily
and Piantadosi [45] investigated this question by presenting naturally-occurring
texts piece-by-piece to participants, who then tried to guess what entity would
be mentioned next from those that had been mentioned before (along with
a “something new” category for previously unmentioned entities). Their re-
sults revealed a strong correlation between predictability and form of reference,
whereby participants were more likely to correctly predict the next-mentioned
entity in cases in which the text’s author had ultimately chosen to use a pronoun
as compared to when longer definite noun phrases were used.
2.2. A Complication for the Models
The idea that there is a coherent notion of entity prominence that mediates
between production and interpretation is therefore highly compelling. However,
there are also results from the literature that call the idea into question. We
illustrate these issues with examples involving so-called implicit causality
(IC) verbs, as much of the literature to be discussed from this point on has uti-
lized them, as does the new experiment we present. IC verbs are undoubtedly
the most well-studied verb class in the psycholinguistics of pronoun interpre-
tation literature since the seminal papers of Caramazza and colleagues in the
1970s [15, 9, 8, 5, 32, 29, 25, inter alia]. Such verbs are so-called because they
are said to impute causality to one of the participants associated with the event
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they denote, which in turn affects subsequent referential biases. For instance, if
participants in a passage completion task are presented with a prompt like (1a),
(1) a. Amanda amazed Brittany because she
b. Amanda detested Brittany because she
the large majority of completions will point to Amanda as the pronominal ref-
erent. After all, Amanda must be amazing, and hence one expects to hear
why. Because causality is imputed to the subject, verbs like amaze are called
subject-biased IC verbs. If participants are given a prompt like (1b), on
the other hand, the large majority of completions will point to Brittany as the
pronominal referent. After all, Brittany must be detestable, and hence one
expects to hear why. Because causality is imputed to the object, verbs like de-
test are called object-biased IC verbs. The existence of IC biases has been
replicated repeatedly, and is hence one of the bedrock results in the field.
Stevenson et al. [43] reported on a series of passage completion experiments
that investigated pronoun biases across eight distinct context types, including
two subclasses of IC verb (specifically, Stimulus-Experiencer and Experiencer-
Stimulus verbs). In the manipulation for the experiment of interest here (their
Experiment 1), context sentences ended with a full stop, and the follow-ons
varied between including or not including a pronoun in the prompt:
(2) a. Amanda detested Brittany. She
b. Amanda detested Brittany.
Unlike (2a), the free prompt condition (2b) allows participants to pick their own
referring expressions for the first-mentioned entity. Stevenson et al. found two
results of interest. First, across all eight context types, there were a greater
number of references to the previous subject in the pronoun prompt condition
than in the free prompt condition. Crucially, this did not always result in an
overall pronoun bias toward the subject in the pronoun prompt condition: For
instance, for object-biased IC verbs as in (2a), the overall pronoun bias was still
toward the object. Instead, the key finding is that the occurrence of a pronoun
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in the prompt always shifted the distribution of references toward the subject
compared to when no pronoun was provided – that is, for prompts like (2b), the
first-mention bias toward the object was even stronger.
Stevenson et al.’s second finding was that, in their free prompt conditions
across all stimulus types, participants’ choice of referential form for the first-
mentioned entity was heavily biased towards a pronoun when the referent was
the previous subject, and likewise towards a name when the referent was a non-
subject. This result may at first seem contradictory: If participants have a clear
preference to use pronouns to refer to the previous subject and names to refer to
non-subjects, why would the pronoun interpretation bias ever be toward a non-
subject, as was the case for prompts like (2a)? Hence we have initial evidence
for a dissociation between production biases and interpretation biases, casting
doubt on whether the same notion of prominence could underlie both processes.
Other studies similarly cast doubt on the idea of a unified notion of entity
prominence. In an analysis of the behavior of null and overt pronouns in Greek,
Miltsakaki [33] found that whereas participants in a passage completion study
tended to refer to the semantically-focused referent in a free-prompt condition,
they were reluctant to use a pronoun to refer to such referents when they were
in object position, opting for an overt pronoun instead. The production of null
pronouns, instead, was heavily biased toward the referent occupying subject
position, regardless of the semantic bias. This result led Miltsakaki to conclude
that prominence and choice of referring expression can be sensitive to different
properties of discourse entities. Other work indicates that the ways in which
different forms of reference are interpreted within a language are sensitive to dif-
ferent factors that confer entity prominence. For instance, Kaiser and Trueswell
[24] reported on a study that compared the behavior of the Finnish pronoun
ha¨n (s/he) with the demonstrative ta¨ma¨ (this) with respect to the grammati-
cal role and word order position of possible antecedents. The results revealed
that ha¨n is sensitive primarily to syntactic role (preferring the subject of the
previous sentence) regardless of word order, whereas ta¨ma¨ is sensitive mainly to
word order (preferring postverbal referents, with only a smaller secondary effect
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favoring objects over subjects). Their results lead them to conclude that there
is no single notion of entity prominence that governs all referential form usage;
instead different referential expressions exhibit varying degrees of sensitivity to
different contextual factors.
2.3. The Bayesian Model
At this point we have evidence for an asymmetry between reference interpre-
tation and production [43, 33], but no model that makes quantitative predictions
about the relationship between the two. Kehler et al. [25] offered an analysis
that addresses this need. Specifically, they proposed that the relationship be-
tween production and interpretation is Bayesian, as shown in equation (3).
(3) P (referent | pronoun) = P (pronoun | referent) P (referent)∑
referent∈referents
P (pronoun | referent) P (referent)
The term P (referent | pronoun) represents the interpretation bias: The proba-
bility, given that a pronoun has occurred, of it being used by the speaker to refer
to a particular referent. On the other hand, the term P (pronoun | referent) rep-
resents the production bias: The probability, assuming that a particular entity
is being referred to, that the speaker would have used a pronoun to refer to it.
Bayes’ Rule says that these biases are not mirror images of each other, but in-
stead are related by the prior P (referent), which represents the next-mention
bias: The probability that a particular referent will get mentioned next regard-
less of the referring expression used.2 On this model, therefore, comprehenders
reverse-engineer the referential intentions of the speaker by combining their es-
timates of the speaker’s production biases with their prior expectations about
the probability that particular entities will be mentioned next. Equation (3)
thus explains why there is nothing contradictory about having both a strong
2The denominator of equation (3) is simply the probability that a pronoun is the form
of reference chosen by the speaker (P (pronoun)), which can be computed by calculating the
value in the numerator for each referent that is compatible with the pronoun and summing
the result. This has the effect of normalizing the probabilities so that they sum to 1.
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production bias toward pronominalizing the previous subject (and not pronom-
inalizing non-subjects) and yet a lack of a subject bias in interpretation, as long
as the prior P (referent) points strongly enough away from the subject referent,
as it does for object-biased IC verbs, for example.3
Kehler et al.’s Bayesian Model comes in two varieties. As it stands, equa-
tion (3) says only that the relationship between pronoun interpretation and
pronoun production follows Bayesian principles, without further specifying the
types of contextual factors that affect each term in the numerator. We refer
to this claim as the weak form of the Bayesian Model. The weak analysis
therefore simply predicts that if independent estimates of the prior, likelihood,
and posterior probabilities were obtained, equation (3) would approximately
hold. Kehler et al. also suggested, however, that the two terms in the numer-
ator of equation (3) are conditioned by different types of contextual factors.
We call this the strong form of the Bayesian Model. On the one hand, they
noted that the data they surveyed suggested that the factors that condition
the next-mention bias P (referent) are primarily semantic (e.g., verb type) and
pragmatic (e.g., coherence relations; see next section). On the other hand,
the factors that condition the production bias P (pronoun | referent) appear to
be grammatical and/or information structural (e.g., based on grammatical role
obliqueness or topichood, both of which amount to a preference for sentential
subjects). Considering this in light of the asymmetry between production and
interpretation captured by equation (3), the strong hypothesis makes a striking
prediction: That the speaker’s decision about whether or not to pronominal-
ize a reference will be insensitive to the semantically- and pragmatically-driven
contextual factors that in part determine the comprehender’s interpretation bi-
3The Bayesian Model, of course, is intended to apply to all contexts in which pronominal
reference could occur. The best scenarios for testing the analysis and comparing it to others,
however, are provided by contexts in which the production bias and prior are expected to
favor different discourse entities, since it is in such contexts that the account predicts the
greatest dissociation between production and interpretation. This is one reason we utilize
object-biased IC contexts in the current study.
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ases. This hypothesis is surprising because it violates the intuition, represented
in the prior work we surveyed in Section 2.1, that speakers will pronominalize
mentions of referents in just those cases in which their comprehenders would be
expected to interpret the pronouns to those same referents.
As unintuitive as this may seem, the results of several recent passage comple-
tion studies have provided preliminary support for this prediction (Rohde, 2008,
Experiments V–VII; Fukumura and van Gompel, 2010). We briefly describe
one reported on by Rohde and Kehler (2014; see also Rohde, 2008, Experiment
VI) which, unlike the other studies, examined pronoun usage in referentially-
ambiguous contexts. Rohde and Kehler’s experiment consisted of a 3x2 design
that crossed context type with prompt type (4).
(4) a. John infuriated Bill. (He)
b. John scolded Bill. (He)
c. John chatted with Bill. (He)
The 3-way context manipulation compared subject-biased IC contexts (4a),
object-biased IC contexts (4b), and non-IC contexts (4c), and the 2-way prompt
condition compared free prompts with pronoun prompts. The production bias
was measured by examining the choice of referring expression (pronoun or name)
that participants employed for the first-mentioned referent in the free prompt
condition, and the interpretation bias was measured using their completions
in the pronoun prompt condition. As expected, the interpretation bias var-
ied with the IC bias across the context types, with subject mentions being
most frequent for (4a), least in (4b), and (4c) being in between. However, this
context difference did not affect rate of pronominalization in the free prompt
condition. Instead, only grammatical role mattered, with participants pronom-
inalizing subject references far more often than non-subject ones. To put a fine
point on this: Participants were no more likely to pronominalize an object men-
tion in an object-biased IC context like (4b) than in a subject-biased IC one
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like (4a), and similarly no more likely to pronominalize a subject mention in a
subject-biased context than in an object-biased one.
2.4. Causal Coherence
The strong Bayesian Model makes a wide variety of predictions not only
about what factors will influence pronoun interpretation, but also about the
causal structure that underlies their influence. The two components that feed
interpretation biases on the model are captured in the simple graphical repre-
sentation shown in Figure 1. The specific prediction tested by the experiment
Next-Mention Biases!
P(referent)
Production Bias!
P(pronoun|referent)
Interpretation Bias!
P(referent|pronoun)
[ Semantic/Pragmatic !
Factors ]
[ Grammatical / Information  !
Structural Factors ]
Figure 1: A Basic Graphical Model
described at the end of the previous section varied a semantic factor – IC verb
bias – to test the hypothesis that it would have an effect on interpretation biases
imposed indirectly through an effect on the prior, while having no effect on the
production bias. The hypothesis was confirmed, providing preliminary support
for the account.
Ultimately, the account predicts that anything that affects the prior, no
matter how seemingly independent of pronominalization, should nonetheless
show an influence on pronoun interpretation. At the same time, relatively few,
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if any, of such factors should also affect pronoun production. Our goal in this
paper is to find a pragmatic factor that, by way of a chain of linguistically-
motivated causal dependencies, would be predicted by the model to have this
differential effect on interpretation and production. The manipulation we use
brings together the referential biases associated with IC verbs that we have
discussed with two other semantic and pragmatic facts, described here.
The first fact is that IC verbs are associated not only with strong referential
biases, but also another type of bias that bears on the coherence relations
that hold between clauses. Kehler et al. [25] conducted a free-prompt passage
completion study that used a variant of the three-way context manipulation
shown in (4a-c). The results revealed that participants completed passages
such as (4a-b) with sentences that participated in an Explanation coherence
relation – i.e., in which an utterance describing an event or state is followed
by one describing a cause of or reason for it – approximately 60% of the time.
This figure compared with only 24% for a control group of non-IC contexts
(4c). This result accords with intuitions: Upon hearing John amazed Mary,
it seems likely that the addressee will wonder Why?, and thus expect to hear
an answer. On the other hand, upon hearing John saw Mary, it seems less
likely that the addressee will wonder Why?, and instead expect an answer to a
different question, for example, What happened next?.
The second fact utilized by the current study is that causal inferences can
be established between contents arising not only from adjacent sentences, but
also from different constituents within a sentence. Consider (5a-b):
(5) a. The boss fired the employee who was embezzling money.
b. The boss fired the employee who was hired in 2002.
In a typical context, a comprehender is likely to infer from sentence (5a) not
only that the employee was fired and was embezzling money, but that he was
fired because he was embezzling money. Note this inference, which relates the
meanings of the matrix verb and the relative clause (RC) that modifies the
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direct object, is merely invited (i.e., not entailed) and is hence defeasible: (5a)
could be felicitously followed with a sentence such as The reason the employee
was fired is that he never showed up to work on time. In contrast, sentence (5b)
will not generally be enriched to a causal interpretation, that is, it will not be
taken to imply that being hired in 2002 was the cause for the firing. Here the
RC is understood to simply be identificational, i.e. to restrict the reference of
the noun phrase to which it attaches.
Rohde et al. [38] previously examined the role of such causal inferences in
RC processing. Their studies utilized the three facts we have just surveyed
– i.e. the strong referential biases associated with IC verbs, the fact that IC
verbs create an expectation for an ensuing explanation, and the fact that RCs
can invite the inference of an explanation – in order to test whether discourse
biases can influence syntactic attachment decisions. To see the logic, consider
the relative clauses in (6–7) with the sample follow-ons in (a-b):
(6) John babysits the children of the musician who...
a. ...is a resident of La Jolla. [low]
b. ...are students at a private school. [high]
(7) John detests the children of the musician who...
a. ...lives in La Jolla. [low]
b. ...are arrogant and rude. [high]
Note that there is a temporary attachment ambiguity at the time that the
head of the RC (i.e., who) is encountered: The RC could attach to the high
NP, headed by children, or the low NP, headed by musician. It has been
widely documented that English has a low-attachment bias for RCs [13, 10, 12,
inter alia]. The preference for low attachment therefore predicts uniform biases
across (6-7); for instance, in a passage completion experiment, one would expect
to see more low-attaching completions (6a-7a) than high-attaching ones (6b-7b).
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One would likewise expect the RC verb lives in (6a-7a), which agrees in number
with the lower NP, to be easier to process on-line than the verb are in (6b-7b),
which agrees with the higher NP.
Rohde et al.’s analysis, however, predicted a difference between (6–7), based
on the fact that the matrix clauses differ in the verb employed: The verb detests
is an object-biased IC verb, whereas babysits is non-IC. Rohde et al. asked what
one would expect to happen if comprehenders are able to utilize the three afore-
mentioned facts when making a syntactic attachment decision. Specifically, if
object-biased IC verbs like detest (i) generate a greater-than-usual pragmatic
expectation for an ensuing explanation, (ii) comprehenders are implicitly aware
that RCs can serve the pragmatic function of describing such an explanation,
and (iii) comprehenders have a pragmatic expectation that an ensuing expla-
nation is most likely to be about the direct object, then we might expect a
greater bias for the RC to attach to the direct object – which, crucially, is the
high attachment point for the RC – in (7) as compared to non-IC verbs as in
(6). This prediction results from the fact that non-IC verbs do not create the
same expectation that an explanation will ensue, nor do they have as strong of
a referential bias towards their direct objects.
This reasoning only goes through, of course, if the three types of pragmatic
information described in (i)-(iii) above are utilized in concert during the normal
course of syntactic processing. But this is exactly what Rohde et al. found. In a
passage completion experiment, participants wrote more continuations that at-
tached high in the IC condition than the non-IC condition. Further, in a reading
time experiment, high-attaching RCs were read more quickly that low-attaching
RCs in IC contexts, whereas the reverse pattern held for non-IC contexts. In
fact, high-attaching RCs in the IC condition were read faster than any of the
other three conditions.
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3. Study
The experimental results just discussed demonstrate how a seemingly subtle
aspect of passage understanding – a causal enrichment – can affect interpretation
in empirically measurable respects, in this case by way of biasing where RCs are
likely to attach during syntactic processing. In the study that follows, we use
a similar manipulation to evaluate the effects of inferred causes in the domain
of discourse interpretation, specifically on pronoun interpretation. Example
stimuli are shown in (8):
(8) a. The doctor reproached the patient who never takes her medicine.
She
[ExplanationRC, PronounPrompt]
b. The doctor reproached the patient who came in at 3pm.
She
[NoExplanationRC, PronounPrompt]
c. The doctor reproached the patient who never takes her medicine.
[ExplanationRC, FreePrompt]
d. The doctor reproached the patient who came in at 3pm.
[NoExplanationRC, FreePrompt]
Importantly, accounts of pronoun interpretation that appeal primarily to surface-
level characteristics of the context (first-mention, subject assignment, grammat-
ical role parallelism, and so forth) find little to distinguish (8a-b): The verb and
event participants are mentioned from the same grammatical positions; indeed
the only difference is the RC that attaches to the direct object.
The Bayesian Model does predict a difference, however, based on an inter-
connected sequence of referential and coherence-driven interdependencies, as
illustrated in the elaborated graphical model shown in Figure 2. First, we
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manipulate RC type because we predict that participants will write fewer Ex-
planation continuations in (8a) and (8c) than (8b) and (8d) respectively. This
is the case because, although previous work suggests that we should expect an
explanation to follow a sentence with an IC verb, the RCs in (8a) and (8c)
already provide one. Hence participants should be more likely to continue with
a different coherence relation [41, 25, 7].
RC Type [ExplRC] The doctor reproached the patient who never takes her medicine.  [Control] The doctor reproached the patient who came in at 3pm.
Coherence 
Relations
ExplRC: fewer Explanations
Next-Mention Biases
P(referent)
Production Bias
P(pronoun|referent)
ExplRC: fewer object next-mentions
(i.e., more subject references) Subjects: more pronounsExplRC: no effect
Interpretation Bias
P(referent|pronoun) Pronoun prompt: more subject references
ExplRC: fewer object refs (= more subjects)
Predictions
Figure 2: Predictions as a Graphical Model
Second, a difference in the percentage of Explanation continuations is in
turn predicted to yield a difference in next-mention biases (P (referent)). This
is due to the fact that the majority of coherence relations that a participant
could employ besides Explanation are more strongly biased to the subject in
object-biased IC contexts [25]. That is, whereas even the object bias for Expla-
nation is merely a tendency – (8b) could still be followed with an Explanation
continuation with the pronoun referring to the subject, as in He didn’t like the
employee’s attitude – the bias toward the object is stronger than that for most
other relations in these contexts. Thus, a reduction in the number of Explana-
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tion continuations for (8d) compared to (8c) should lead to a greater number of
subject biased relations, and hence fewer next mentions of the object.
Third, the analysis predicts that rates of pronoun production (P (referent|pronoun))
as measured in the FreePrompt condition (8c-d) should only be affected by gram-
matical role (favoring pronominalizations of the subject), and hence display no
interaction with RC type (with participants no less likely to pronominalize sub-
ject mentions, and likewise no more likely to pronominalize object mentions, in
8d than 8c). This accords with the prediction of the strong Bayesian Model
that semantic and pragmatic factors assert influence on the next-mention bias
but not the production bias.
Finally, RC type is predicted to affect interpretation biases as measured in
the PronounPrompt condition, with a greater number of object interpretations
in (8b) than (8a), since P (referent|pronoun) is determined in part by next-
mention expectations (P (referent)). As such, we predict the RC manipulation
to have an effect on pronoun interpretation, but not production. Since inter-
pretation biases are also determined in part by production biases, an effect of
grammatical role favoring subjects is also predicted in (8a-b) compared to their
FreePrompt counterparts in (8c-d).
3.1. Participants
In service of obtaining a heterogeneous group of self-reported native speakers
of English, participants were recruited using Mechanical Turk [34, 16]. Of the
40 total participants, 20 were female, 19 male, and one unspecified. Ages ranged
from 21 to 60 years old (mean 32.5), and levels of education ranged from high
school through having a Master’s degree (30 had at least some college training,
and 16 had a 4-year degree or higher).
All participants were located in the United States, with a broad range of
locales represented. Because we wanted to use monolingual speakers but didn’t
want people to be incentivized to lie about their native speaker status, we al-
lowed anyone with a US IP address to participate (and paid everyone). We
then only used the data from participants who answered “no” to a question in
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a background questionnaire that asked whether any language besides English
was spoken at home before the age of 6.
3.2. Design
A 2x2 design was employed using stimuli like (8a-d), which varied RC type
(ExplanationRC or NoExplanationRC) and prompt type (PronounPrompt or
FreePrompt). The experiment employed 24 target items and 36 fillers. The
fillers were included to conceal the target manipulation; context sentences var-
ied between sentences with only one event participant (Alex rode his bike to work
this morning), two participants of different gender (Drew chatted with Susan for
an hour after the parade), and two participants of the same gender but without
an IC verb (Stacy played video games with Tanya all afternoon). Free prompts,
pronoun prompts, and connective prompts (As a result, ) were
used. Three ‘catch’ fillers that employed prompts that suggested an obvious
continuation were also included to ensure that participants were paying atten-
tion (Caleb did all the cooking for the BBQ even though he hates BBQ. He
prefers mac ’n ). All participants completed these trials in a
manner consistent with paying attention to the task and hence no participant’s
data was eliminated from analysis as a result.
Context sentences for the target items always used object-biased IC verbs
in the matrix clause. Discourse continuations were collected via a web-based
interface that participants accessed from their own computer. Each item was
presented on a page by itself with a text box in which participants were in-
structed to write their continuation. Two pieces of clip art were also displayed
that indicated the gender of each event participant (always the same for both
event participants for target items, so that reference in the PronounPrompt
condition would be ambiguous). The task took less than an hour. Participants
saw each stimulus in a single condition in a fully balanced design.
Two judges who were blind to the hypotheses annotated the data for coher-
ence relations (Explanation or Other), first-mentioned referent (Subject, Ob-
ject, or Other), and form of reference in the FreePrompt condition (Pronoun or
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Other). For determining whether the coherence relation was Explanation, anno-
tators where asked to consider whether the eventuality described in the second
sentence provides an explanation for the eventuality described in the first, and
were offered two tests to apply: (i) whether the second sentence answers the
question Why? with respect to the first, and (ii) whether the connective be-
cause could be felicitously used to connect the sentences without changing the
construal of the passage on its most natural interpretation. So as to not bias
the annotation of reference toward any particular annotator’s own referential
preferences, annotators were told to err on the side of categorizing a reference
as ambiguous if the pronoun could be interpreted as plausibly coreferential with
either event participant, even if their own biases suggested a particular one.
The number of cases in which pronouns were judged as ambiguous were spread
relatively evenly across all four conditions; representative examples are shown
in (9):
(9) a. The editor corrected the reporter who had made an obvious error. He
was upset.
b. The nun praised the parishioner who was from San Diego county. She
was excited.
c. The actress assisted the maid who needed help moving the furniture.
She cleaned the dust bunnies under the couch.
The Cohen’s kappa coefficient for measuring interannotator agreement was 0.71
for coherence and 0.88 for reference. In both annotations, the majority of dis-
agreements were the result of one annotator rating a completion as ambiguous
and the other not.
Of the 960 total continuations, we excluded those that did not mention the
subject or object directly (e.g., mentioning a different entity, using a pleonastic
subject, or mentioning both subject and object with plural they ; 52 continu-
ations, all in the FreePrompt condition), those in which reference was judged
by at least one annotator to be ambiguous or for which the annotators picked
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different referents (63 continuations), and those that were unanalyzable due to
being ungrammatical or not complete sentences (4 continuations), leaving 841
continuations for analysis (398 FreePrompt and 443 PronounPrompt continua-
tions). Of those, the referring expressions produced in the FreePrompt condition
consisted of pronouns (He, She) and non-pronominal the-NPs. Of the 125 the-
NPs, 112 used same NP as in context sentence (the maid → the maid), 6 used
a shortened NP with the same head noun (the baseball player → the player), 5
used an NP with a different head noun (the second grader → the student), and
2 used an NP with a different head noun along with a modifier (the rock star
→ the poor sap).
Outcomes were modeled using mixed-effects logistic regression with maximal
random effects structure when supported by the data [6]. Where a model did
not converge, we successively removed random effects, chosen by the lowest
variance. All factors were centered. To test for main effects and interactions,
we conducted likelihood ratio tests between mixed-effects models differing only
in the presence or absence of the targeted fixed effect.
3.3. Results
All of the predictions outlined at the top of this section were confirmed.
Recall that the first prediction is that we would see a greater percentage of
Explanation relations in the NoExplanationRC condition than in the Explana-
tionRC condition. This expectation is based on the idea that participants are
less likely to write a completion that explains the event described by the matrix
clause if an explanation was already provided by the RC. The results, shown in
Figure 3, confirm the hypothesis (main effect of RC type on coherence relation,
see Table 1).
This leads to the second hypothesis, which is that for the FreePrompt con-
dition, we will see a greater percentage of next mentions of the object referent
in the NoExplanationRC condition than in the ExplanationRC condition. This
expectation results from the fact that the strong next-mention bias associated
with object-biased IC verbs is conditioned on the next sentence providing an
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Figure 3: Percentage of Explanation Continuations in each RC condition (Standard Errors
over Participant Means)
Fixed Effect Coefficient Std Error z-value p-value
RC 2.06 0.39 5.240 <0.001
Prompt 0.16 0.24 0.67 0.51
RCxPrompt -0.03 0.66 -0.04 0.97
Table 1: Output for model of binary coherence outcome, Explanation or not, where conver-
gence was reached with full random effect structure
explanation; thus fewer explanations should result in fewer object mentions.
The results, shown in Figure 4, confirmed this as well (main effect of RC type
on next mention for free-prompt subset, see Table 2).
Our third hypothesis is that the rate of pronominalization during produc-
tion in the FreePrompt condition will not be similarly affected by RC condition;
instead, it should only be affected by grammatical role, favoring pronominaliza-
tion of the subject referent. This prediction results from the fact that we only
expect a shift in coherence relations to affect the prior, to which production
biases should be insensitive. Figure 5 shows the percentage of the time that
21
Exp NoExp
%
 O
bj
ec
t
0
20
40
60
80
100
Figure 4: Percentage of Next-Mentions of Direct Object in each RC condition in FreePrompt
Condition
references to a particular entity (subject or object) within a particular RC con-
dition were pronominalized. The results confirm the effect of grammatical role
and lack of interaction with RC condition (see Table 3).
Lastly, the analysis makes two predictions for pronoun interpretation bi-
ases P (referent | pronoun) as measured by the PronounPrompt condition. The
results are shown in Figure 6. (Note that the bars for the FreePrompt con-
dition, which represent the prior P (referent), are identical to those shown in
Figure 4.) First, we predict a greater percentage of object mentions in the No-
ExplanationRC condition than in the ExplanationRC condition, as a result of
interpretation biases shifting along with the effect of RC type on the prior term
in equation 3. This was confirmed (main effect of RC type on next mention for
pronoun-prompt subset, see Table 2). Second, we predict a lower percentage
of object mentions in the PronounPrompt condition than the FreePrompt con-
dition, as a result of interpretation biases shifting along with the influence of
grammatical role on the likelihood term in equation 3, specifically toward the
subject. This was also borne out (main effect of prompt on next mention, see
Table 2). The results therefore confirm that a subtle pragmatic manipulation
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Fixed Effect Coefficient Std Error z-value p-value
Analysis of full data set
RC 1.22 0.40 3.07 <0.005
Prompt -1.27 0.34 -4.14 <0.001
RCxPrompt 0.85 0.43 1.64 0.08
Follow-up analysis of FreePrompt subset
RC 0.72 0.42 2.43 <0.05
Follow-up analysis of PronounPrompt subset
RC 1.17 0.43 3.09 <0.005
Table 2: Output for model of binary coreference outcome, object referent or not, where
convergence was reached with full random effect structure
Fixed Effect Coefficient Std Error z-value p-value
RC 0.94 0.42 2.34 0.08
GramRole 4.11 0.60 6.94 <0.001
RCxGramRole 0.12 0.99 0.09 0.92
Table 3: Output for model of binary pronominalization outcome, pronoun or not, where
convergence was reached with inclusion only of by-participant random slopes for grammatical
role and the RC x grammatical role interaction and a by-item random slope for the interaction
of the context – whether or not an RC invites the inference of a cause of the
matrix event – influences pronoun interpretation biases, but not production bi-
ases. The effect on interpretation is a surprise for theories based on surface-level
characteristics of the context which, as noted earlier, find little to distinguish
contexts like (8a-b).
3.4. Model Comparison
Finally, we can use the data collected here to test our Bayesian Model,
i.e., that equation (3) captures the relationship between pronoun production
and interpretation biases. We compare the predictions of the Bayesian Model
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Figure 5: Rate of Pronominalization of Next-Mentioned Entity in FreePrompt Condition, by
Grammatical Role and RC Condition
against two competing models. In each case, the predictions of the models can
be evaluated using the results of our passage completion experiments. That
is, the values on the right hand side of the formulas (specifically, the terms
representing the next-mention and production biases) can be estimated using
biases measured in the FreePrompt condition. The predicted interpretation
biases of each model can then be compared against the actual interpretation
biases measured in the PronounPrompt condition.
The first competing model is what we have called the Mirror Model, ac-
cording to which the interpretation bias toward a referent is proportional to
the likelihood that a speaker would produce a pronoun to refer to that referent.
Capturing the intuition that hearers will base their interpretation decisions on
their estimates about what referent mentions the speaker is likely to choose a
pronoun to carry out, the predicted interpretation bias for this model is esti-
mated using the pronominalization rate P (pronoun | referent) measured in the
FreePrompt condition, normalized by the sum of the pronominalization rate for
all referents. Interestingly, this formula essentially boils down to equation (3)
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Figure 6: Percentage of Next-Mentions of the Direct Object by Prompt Condition and RC
Condition
without the prior terms:4
(10) P (referent | pronoun)← P (pronoun | referent)∑
referent∈referents
P (pronoun | referent)
The second competing model is what we have called the Expectancy Model,
according to which the interpretation bias toward a referent equals the probabil-
ity that the referent gets re-mentioned [3]. The predicted interpretation bias for
this model is thus estimated to be the next-mention bias P (referent) measured
in the FreePrompt condition. Interestingly, this formula essentially boils down
to equation (3) without the likelihood terms:5
(11) P (referent | pronoun)← P (referent)∑
referent∈referents
P (referent)
4We use the assignment operator (←) to underscore the fact that the model is not consistent
with normative probability theory.
5Strictly speaking, the numerator of (11) is already a probability distribution, so there
is no need for a normalization term. We write it like this to highlight the parallelism with
equation (10) in effectively representing one half of the Bayesian formulation.
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Finally, per equation (3), the predicted interpretation bias for the Bayesian
Model results from combining the probabilities utilized by each of these other
two models. We compare the predicted interpretation values for all three models
against the observed pronoun interpretation biases P (referent | pronoun), as
measured by the data collected in the PronounPrompt conditions.
Actual Bayesian Mirror Expectancy
ExplRC .215 .229 .321 .385
NoExplRC .410 .373 .334 .542
R2 (participants/items) .48/.49 .34/.42 .14/.12
Table 4: Actual and Predicted Rates of Pronominal Reference to Object
Table 4 shows the observed and model-predicted rates at which a pronoun
prompt was interpreted to refer to the object across the two RC conditions. As
can be seen, the observed values are most closely matched by the Bayes-derived
values.
Finally, we also expect the Bayesian Model to exhibit a closer fit to the ob-
served data with respect to the referential behavior both individual participants
and individual items. Therefore, following Rohde and Kehler [37], we also test
the degree of correlation between the values observed in the PronounPrompt
condition and those generated by the three different analyses using linear mod-
els. The correlation is performed over participant and item means; each partici-
pant (or item) contributes a value for the four pronoun interpretation estimates
in each of the RC condition referent combinations. We excluded from all models
data points from participants (or items) for which the Mirror- and Bayes-derived
values could not be estimated—specifically if a participants no-pronoun prompt
responses for a particular RC condition contained no mentions of a particular
referent or no pronouns for either referent; in both cases computing the predicted
probabilities of the Mirror and Bayesian Models would involve division by zero.
Each of the 40 participants stood to contribute observed- and model-derived
probabilities for subject and object mention in each of the RC conditions; out
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of this hypothetical total of 160 data points, 16 were excluded. Likewise for the
24 items, out of the hypothetical total of 96 datapoints, 6 were excluded. We
expect that the predictions of all models will reveal some degree of correlation
with the observed data: The Mirror Model should capture the differences in bi-
ases between subject and non-subject referents, whereas the Expectancy Model
should capture differences across context type. Crucially, however, in combining
the biases captured by both models, we expect the Bayesian Model to be more
highly correlated than either of the other models alone. And this is in fact the
case, as can be seen in the last row of Table 4.
4. Conclusion
A fundamental assumption that has underlied much of the literature on pro-
noun use is that there is a unified notion of prominence that mediates between
production and interpretation. As we have noted, however, there has also been
research that casts doubt on this assumption. We sought to examine the as-
sumption by manipulating a more subtle aspect of the context than has been
utilized in previous work, particularly whether or not an RC invites the infer-
ence of a cause of the event described by the matrix clause. Whereas many
previous accounts offer no reason to think that such a manipulation would have
an effect on pronoun interpretation biases, our experimental results show that
it does, in exactly the respect predicted by the Bayesian Model. At the same
time, we also found that the manipulation had no effect on pronoun production
behavior. Whereas this mismatch may seem unintuitive, it reflects precisely the
dissociation between production and interpretation captured by the Bayesian
Model.
A key aspect of the design was the degree of indirection between the lin-
guistic locus of the manipulation and the actual linguistic phenomenon being
evaluated. As we indicated in Section 2.4, the analysis predicts that anything
that affects a comprehender’s prior expectations about what entities will be
mentioned next will also affect pronoun interpretation biases. In the experiment
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presented here, an RC manipulation was shown to affect interpretation biases by
way of a specific hierarchical chain of causal dependencies: The invitation of an
inference of an explanation directly affected the distribution of ensuing coher-
ence relations, which in turn affected next-mention expectations, which in turn
affected pronoun interpretation. So does this mean that future studies should
put RC type alongside other factors when performing statistical analyses over
pronoun interpretation data? The answer is clearly no. On our analysis, the
pronoun model is not where this factor, nor others that are commonly included
in such data analyses, properly belong. Instead, per Figure 2, this particular
factor belongs in a model for predicting the distribution of ensuing coherence
relations in a discourse context. The fact that RC type ultimately affects pro-
noun interpretation will be captured by the fact that models of interpretation
will properly include next-mention expectations, and models of next-mention
expectations will properly include coherence relation expectations. So whereas
canonical ‘bag-of-cues’ analyses typically model the different factors that affect
interpretation as an undifferentiated set, we would claim that the factors on the
right-hand side of Figure 2 are properly modeled independently of pronouns. As
far as pronoun interpretation is considered, the factors that influence the prior
reside in a black box.
The results also show that whereas prior next-mention expectations are an
important component of pronoun interpretation [3], they also confirm that in-
terpretation biases are not reducible to those expectations. Our results thus
bear relevance to studies on communicative efficiency such as that of Tily and
Piantadosi [45], which appeal to the oft-noted Zipfian tendency for predictable
information to be articulatorily reduced. Whereas there can be no doubt that
there is a relationship between pronouns (in their role as the most reduced forms
of referring) and referent predictability, our results again reveal that the con-
nection is only partial. That is, pronouns do not merely function as unbound
variables to be immediately assigned to the most expected entity at the time
in the discourse at which they are encountered; they carry their own linguis-
tic biases aside from entity predictability as captured by the likelihood term of
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equation 3. Therefore, studies that examine pronominalization as a mechanism
for languages to optimize communicative efficiency need to take this level of
indirection into account.
A remaining question is how well the Bayesian Model captures the relation-
ship between production and interpretation for a broader set of referring ex-
pression types across languages. Whereas we have focused on English personal
pronouns here and in our prior work [25, 26], we would expect the weak ver-
sion of the Bayesian Model to apply more generally across referential systems:
If comprehenders reverse-engineer the referential intentions of the speaker by
combining their estimates of production and next-mention biases when inter-
preting personal pronouns, the same should be true for other reference types as
well. Importantly, however, we would expect that the relative impact of these
two biases to vary across referential forms, since according to equation 3, the
more strongly the production bias for a particular referring expression singles
out a particular entity, the less easily next-mention biases will be able to push
the preferred assignment away from that entity during interpretation.6 Kaiser
[23], for instance, reports that the interpretation of German demonstratives,
which tend to be strongly biased toward the preceding object, is modulated
to some degree by coherence relations, but less so than are personal pronouns,
which tend to be biased toward the preceding subject. (For related work on
demonstratives see [24] for Finnish and [39, 40] for German.) Such a finding
is consistent with the Bayesian Model if in fact demonstratives have a stronger
production bias toward the object than personal pronouns do toward the sub-
ject. A comprehensive evaluation of the Bayesian Model on demonstratives and
other forms of reference awaits future work.
Finally, we return to the core question of the place of prominence in a theory
6To take an extreme example, consider first-person singular pronouns which, assuming a
direct speech context, can only be used to refer to the speaker. In this case, the production
bias for referents other than the speaker will be zero, and the speaker will be the predicted
referent no matter how strongly the prior is biased toward other entities.
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of pronoun interpretation, a relationship which, frankly, has historically been
problematic. Whereas almost any paper on the topic will claim that pronouns
refer to prominent (salient, accessible, predictable, in-focus) entities, it must
be asked how the factors that contribute to prominence are determined. Un-
fortunately, the answer is typically that they are identified by researchers who
examine the properties of pronominal referents in psycholinguistic and/or cor-
pus data. This obviously leads to circularity: For the claim that pronouns refer
to prominent entities to carry any content, the prominence of entities must be
identifiable on grounds that are completely divorced from the forms of referring
expression speakers use to refer to them.7
Only after examining production and interpretation behavior independently
does it become clear that there can be no single notion of prominence that
mediates between the two. According to the Bayesian Model, there are in
fact two relevant notions. The first is entity predictability, as captured by the
prior, and estimated by analyzing next-mention biases in free prompt passage
completions. Crucially, the question of what entity will be mentioned next
is independent of what particular referring expression a speaker chooses when
referring to it, and hence as a notion of prominence it does not suffer from
the circularity issues just noted. The second notion we need is the one that
captures production biases. Is there a similarly reference-independent notion of
prominence to be found here? Various authors [17, 18, 37, inter alia] have argued
that the relevant linguistic notion is topicality, according to which the linguistic
function of pronouns is to signal a continuation of the current topic. Insofar
as this idea is correct and further that topicality can be defined as a coherent
7To be clear, we are not saying that previous work fails to make a distinction between a
conceptually-independent notion of prominence or activation of entities in the discourse on
the one hand, and the signals that referring expressions encode with respect to the notion
of prominence or activation on the other. Indeed, many theories do just that [1, 21, 18, 28,
inter alia]. The point is that the notion of prominence or activation appealed to is typically
highly informed by the behavior of pronominal reference as witnessed in data, rather than
being measurable by independent means.
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linguistic notion on its own terms [19, 35] – both far from settled questions
– there is hope that both types of prominence to which pronoun behavior is
sensitive can be defined on independent grounds.8
The results presented here thus join the two studies utilizing IC contexts de-
scribed in Rohde and Kehler [37] in showing that the predictions of the Bayesian
Model provide a better fit with measured interpretation biases than competing
models. (See also Rohde [36, pp. 126-128] for a discussion of the model with
respect to transfer-of-possession contexts, which provide another context type
in which the next-mention bias points strongly away from the non-subject.)
Time will tell if the strong form of the Bayesian Model will hold up to further
experimental scrutiny when applied to a broader range of context types and
conditions. Whichever way that goes, we hope that our attempt to propose and
defend a specific model will be part of a shift in emphasis from demonstrations
that various linguistic factors have an effect on pronoun use to explanatory mod-
els that make their own quantitative, empirically testable predictions. Whereas
empirical findings of the relevance of different factors on reference are useful,
8To be sure, there is evidence for the existence of topics provided by the behavior of
linguistic phenomena other than pronouns. For instance, Strawson [44] famously argued
that only topical definite NPs carry existential presuppositions, i.e., whereas the sentence The
King of France is bald cannot be assigned a truth value due to the non-existence of the topical
king, the sentence Fred’s class was visited by the King of France, under a construal in which
Fred’s class is the topic, is more readily judged as simply false according to the intuitions
of many speakers. Likewise, Kuno [30] proposes a Topichood Constraint on Extraction
that captures why the question Who did you read a book about? is felicitous but Who did
you lose a book about? is odd, as one could construe John Irving as being the topic of the
sentence I read a book about John Irving, but not of I lost a book about John Irving, since one
typically reads, but does not lose, books because of their content. Finally, Reinhart proposes
the “Speaking of X” test for topichood, which captures why Speaking of John Irving, I read a
book about him is felicitous whereas Speaking of John Irving, I lost a book about him is odd.
See Gundel and Fretheim [20] for additional examples and useful discussion. Whereas these
facts show that the evidence for topicality extends beyond the behavior of pronouns, there is
no well-understood set of necessary and sufficient conditions on offer for identifying the topic
across sentences and contexts.
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they are not themselves theories; they are instead the data that we build theories
to try to explain. If indeed the Bayesian Model fails to extend to a larger set of
psycholinguistic examinations, we look forward to new quantitatively testable
models offered as competitors, and to how those models inform questions about
the relevant notions of prominence in reference and pragmatics more generally.
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Appendix: Stimuli
1. The actress assisted the maid who needed help moving the furniture /
who worked the morning shift. (She)
2. The agent pities the rockstar who never seems to draw a crowd / who he
managed to sign last week. (He)
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3. The airline executive trusted the pilot who has a spotless flying record /
who flies the nonstop from Philadelphia to San Diego. (He)
4. The announcer mocked the baseball player who had struck out four times
in a row / who was first in the batting lineup. (He)
5. The babysitter despises the child who acts out at every opportunity / who
is left home every Friday night. (She)
6. The businessman worships the accountant who found him a new set of tax
deductions / who joined the team last week. (He)
7. The chessmaster ridiculed the novice who made a bad move / who had
his lesson on Friday afternoons. (He)
8. The child fears the karate instructor who acts like a drill sargeant / who
recently joined the training studio. (He)
9. The company president pacified the investor who was complaining about
the impending merger / who stopped by for an impromptu meeting. (He)
10. The doctor reproached the patient who never takes her medicine / who
came in at 3pm. (She)
11. The editor corrected the reporter who had made an obvious error / who
had written that day’s lead story. (She)
12. The employee envied the manager who had gotten a big raise / who worked
in the next department over. (He)
13. The landlord valued the tenant who always keeps the apartment clean /
who moved in last February. (He)
14. The musician detests the record label representative who always puts down
her music / who flew into town this morning. (She)
15. The nun praised the parishioner who had worked so hard to help the poor
/ who was from San Diego county. (She)
16. The onlooker complimented the bride who looked dazzling in her designer
wedding dress / who arrived at the restaurant. (She)
17. The politician resented the journalist who opened the interview by asking
about her extramarital affairs / who interviewed her yesterday. (She)
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18. The professor rewarded the student who received a perfect score on the
final / who stopped by during office hours yesterday. (She)
19. The restaurant owner scolded the chef who was routinely letting food go
to waste / who was hired last month. (He)
20. The scientist hates the health and safety expert who fines them after every
inspection / who the company hired last month. (She)
21. The secretary adores the lawyer who gives her a big raise each year / who
works in the office across from her desk. (She)
22. The teacher blamed the second grader who has a reputation for stealing
things / who sits in the front of the class. (He)
23. The trainer consoled the boxer who had lost the fight / who had trained
with him for 16 months. (He)
24. The wedding planner criticized the florist who had brought dying flowers
to the ceremony / who had been hired for the ceremony. (She)
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